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The limits of everyday nationhood
ANTHONY SMITH
London School of Economics, UK
Some brilliant early essays by John Stuart Mill, Lord Acton and Ernest
Renan apart, the study of nationalism is barely a century old. But, starting
with the Austro-Marxists Otto Bauer and Karl Renner in the 1900s, and the
historical analyses of nationalist ideology by Carlton Hayes, Louis Snyder
and Hans Kohn from the 1920s, there has been a burgeoning literature on
every aspect of nations and nationalism. In the post-war period, social
scientists like Karl Deutsch (1966) and Ernest Gellner (1964 and 1983)
joined the historians in their quest to uncover the intertwined causes of
nationalism’s appeal and the proliferation of nation states in the wake of
decolonization. The high point of this social science approach was reached
in the late 1970s and the 1980s with the publications of Michael Hechter
(1975), Tom Nairn (1977), John Armstrong (1982), John Breuilly
(1993[1982]), Benedict Anderson (1981[1982]), Eric Hobsbawm and
Terence Ranger (1983),Anthony Smith (1986) and John Hutchinson (1987).
The works of each of these scholars contained a ‘grand narrative’ of nation-
alism: an overall account of why and how the world became divided into
nations, and why nationalism became the dominant ideology of the modern
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epoch. Of course, as one would expect in any field of study, there have been
sharp divisions over key issues such as the definition of the nation, the antiq-
uity of nations and nationalism, and the relationship between ethnicity and
nationalism. Yet, there was also a surprising degree of agreement over the
need for a broad theoretical and historical approach to the many issues in
the field – a consensus reinforced in subsequent works by Eric Hobsbawm
(1990), Liah Greenfeld (1992), Walker Connor (1994), Adrian Hastings
(1997) and Steven Grosby (2002).
Yet, the same decade of the 1990s saw a clear rejection of the grand
narratives and the causal-historical rationale behind these accounts.
Influenced by the cultural turn of postmodernism, and drawing on a number
of sources – the works of Benedict Anderson (1991[1983]) and Michael
Billig (1995), discourse analysis, gender studies, cultural studies and politi-
cal philosophy – the new wave of research in the field has turned its back
on macro-analytic studies and focused instead on specific issues raised by
the multicultural type of liberal society characteristic of the late 20th and
early 21st century West.
In particular, there has been a rejection of elite-centred studies.
Nationalism, it is argued, following Walker Connor, is after all a mass
phenomenon. This is the burden of the article by Jon Fox and Cynthia
Miller-Idriss. Their basic claim is that ‘To make the nation is to make people
national’. Unfortunately, they argue, macro-structural analyses have
focused on nationalism ‘from above’, that is, from the perspective of the
state and the elites; the ‘people’ in whose name nations are constructed ‘are
curiously missing from much of the scholarship’. But, they continue, we
cannot assume that the masses to whom nationalist projects are directed are
always in tune with the nationalist messages of the elites. Rather, their
responses need to be studied in relation to their own concerns and their
own everyday experiences. This constitutes a new field of study, the field of
an ‘everyday nationhood’.
The bulk of Fox and Miller-Idriss’s article is then given over to a system-
atic delineation of such a field under four headings: ‘Talking the Nation’,
the discursive construction of the nation through everyday speech;
‘Choosing the Nation’, the decisions made by ordinary people about nation-
hood (and ethnicity); ‘Performing the Nation’, the ritual enactment of
symbols invoking the nation; and ‘Consuming the Nation’, the expression
of national differences in the daily tastes and preferences of ordinary
people. As the authors point out, none of these aspects is new; there is
already a very considerable literature on each of them. What is new here is
their synthesis of these aspects and their literatures, and their attempt to
establish on this basis a separate field of enquiry and counterpose it to the
role of elites and elite discourse discussed in ‘much of the scholarship’ about
nations and nationalism.
I find much that is attractive and valid in Fox’s and Miller-Idriss’s
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approach, and their review of the literature in these subfields is insightful,
sane and balanced. They are quite justified, as Hobsbawm recognized, in
asking us to problematize and pay much greater attention to the role of
non-elites than the grand narratives appeared to permit. For all that, their
claims raise some fundamental issues about the definition of the field and
the purposes of a study of nations and nationalism.
To begin with, one might question the assumption of an undifferentiated
‘ordinary people’ at the heart of the enterprise. Either ‘the people’ (folk) is
a construct of nationalism itself, as in ‘We, the people . . .’; or it is an unso-
ciological category that needs to be broken down into its constituent parts,
be they individuals, or various organized groups of people (e.g. movements,
parties), or different interest and status groups (castes, classes, ethnic
communities). From this perspective, we may speak of various non-elites,
not simply ‘ordinary people’. But the studies cited by our authors give for
the most part little clue about the non-elite segment of ‘the people’ that is
being studied, and how it relates to wider issues of nationhood and
nationalism.
Of course, in a sense this hardly matters, if one’s purpose is simply to
describe and analyse the national actions and sentiments of non-elites. On
the other hand, it becomes vitally important, the moment one wishes to
engage in a causal analysis of the bases of nations and nationalism. But,
interestingly, while Jon Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss ask both ‘what is the
nation?’ and ‘when is the nation?’ (talked about, performed, etc.), they do
not touch on the main question behind much of the previous scholarship in
the field, namely, ‘why is the nation?’, let alone ‘who is the nation?’. This
gives to their presentation a curiously four-square and static aspect. On the
one hand, there are elites propounding their nationalist messages; on the
other hand, there is the people who receive or ignore the message, and for
whom, it appears, for most of the time nationhood is implicit, but of little
overt concern. There is no sense of any interaction between elites and ‘the
people’, or among groups of non-elites, and between them and the elites,
which would give us a much more complex, nuanced and dynamic picture.
It is a picture to which only a sociohistorical approach could hope to do
justice, and history is what is conspicuously missing in Fox’s and Miller-
Idriss’s prospectus. Theirs is a here-and-now conceptual apparatus and
programme of research, which takes no account of the heritage of
communities or the traditions of successive generations, each building on
(or destroying) the groundwork laid by others before them. While they
concede that ‘everyday nationhood’ should not be studied independently of
state construction, industrialism and elite manipulation, they claim that
nations ‘are not just the product of structural forces; they are simul-
taneously the practical accomplishment of ordinary people engaging in
mundane activities in their everyday lives’.
True enough, but ordinary people and their activities are situated in an
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historic context, and one that is central to the very idea of a nation progress-
ing, as Benedict Anderson memorably reminded us, through linear, ‘empty
homogenous’ time (Anderson, 1991[1983]).
Under the rubrics of the authors’ research programme, there is little
room for temporal questions, for the widespread sense of the nation
existing, if not in ‘nature’, then in ‘immemorial time’. Indeed, it would be
interesting to discover how far the perceptions of time on the part of
different groups matched those of the elites. More important, raising the
‘why’ and ‘who’ questions would inject a sense of process and movement
over time into a research programme that could so easily turn into yet
another example of the ahistorical ‘blocking presentism’ that characterizes
so much recent writing in the field. (See Anderson, 1991[1893]; Peel, 1989)
This lack of historical imagination is reinforced by the tacit ethno-
centrism and state-centrism of Fox’s and Miller-Idriss’s programme. As
regards the first of these, questions of choosing and consuming the nation
make sense in the industrialized West, where relatively liberal regimes allow
a range of national (and other) choices and ethnic preferences, though even
here, there are limits. As Michael Billig remarked:
One can eat Chinese tomorrow and Turkish the day after; one can even dress in
Chinese and Turkish styles. But being Chinese or Turkish are not commercially
available options. (Billig, 1995: 139, emphasis in original)
This constraint is even more marked in the many parts of the developing
world where ‘hot’ nationalisms predominate and where, even for those
who may be indifferent to the nationalist messages of their leaders, the
‘wrong’ choice could prove fatal, and where there is little room to display
individual tastes and ethnic preferences. Even ‘talking the nation’, except in
prescribed ways, could prove dangerous in Burma, North Korea, Saudi
Arabia and Zimbabwe. If this is correct, then ‘everyday life’ as a domain of
the study of nationalism in its own right is necessarily confined, concep-
tually as well as practically, to the democratic West (including post-
communist Europe). Not only can it not serve as a universal subfield; it has
actually little or nothing to say about the most intractable current problems
of nation building and nationalism in large areas of the world. This is a
serious limitation, and once again we see that at its heart lies the attempt
to separate ‘everyday nationhood’ from ‘historic nationhood’, and to sever
the actions and responses of non-elites from those of elites in the common
historic processes and problems of nationhood and nationalism.
To this involuntary ethnocentrism is allied the state-centred basis of the
authors’ research programme. This is partly a matter of the methodological
nationalism that inheres in most questionnaires and quantitative surveys, as
well as in the extrapolations from the ethnographic investigations that they
recommend. But it also stems from the tacit equation of the everyday
nation with the nation state, the failure to separate ‘state’ from ‘nation’, and
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the questionable decision to assimilate ethnic difference and community to
the nation and national identity. What then is talked about, chosen, symbol-
ized and consumed is the nation qua national state – a conclusion reinforced
by the brief opening definition of nationalism drawn from Ernest Gellner:
‘the project to make the political unit, the state (or polity), congruent with
the cultural unit, the nation’ (1983: 1). But this state-centrism creates a
double limitation in Fox and Miller-Idriss’s research programme. The first
is their failure to specify the relevant frame of reference in the case of those
nations without states such as Catalonia, Scotland and Kurdistan, where
there may be a conflict of loyalties or concentric circles of allegiance. Is it
Spain or Catalonia, Britain or Scotland, which is the relevant cultural unit?
And what is the relevant frame of reference of the various immigrant
communities in western states? Here, the failure to separate ethnic
community from nationhood conceals as much as it reveals – in particular,
the very different perceptions, decisions and consumption of nationhood
that members of ethnic minorities may hold and display.
But the second and more serious limitation is the authors’ failure to step
outside the ring of an existing national state and consider the interactions
of elites and non-elites in the formation of nations and the origins and
development of nationalist movements. In other words, the research
programme developed by Fox and Miller-Idriss assumes the framework and
boundaries of an already functioning national state in which ‘ordinary
people’, for the most part citizens of the national state, talk, choose, enact
and consume the (their?) nation. It has little or nothing to tell us about the
sentiments and activities of non-elites either in earlier ethnic communities
or during the formation of nations, or as part of a nationalist movement
aiming to create a nation out of pre-existing ethnic groupings. Moreover,
partly because of the nature of the methodologies proposed, it is only
modern national states that can furnish the necessary arena for the study of
everyday nationhood, and so ‘everyday nationhood’ is revealed as another
species of modernism. Once again, we are locked into the present epoch in
the name of ordinary people.
Ahistoricism; ethnocentrism; nation-statism; the failure to specify ‘the
people’: these are serious limitations and problems for the study of
‘everyday nationhood’ propounded by Jon Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss,
and they stem, I think, from an underlying rejection of the causal-historical
methodology common to previous scholarship in the field. Much of the
understanding and insight gained by these scholarly efforts came precisely
from their readiness to embrace the task of providing an overall account of
nations and nationalism. By concentrating on the ‘what’ and ‘when’ of the
nation as talked, chosen, performed and consumed by ordinary people, and
neglecting the ‘why’ and ‘who’, the study of everyday nationhood becomes
restricted to the micro-analytical and descriptive rather than the causal and
sociohistorical. Its insights are therefore confined to a narrow frame that
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excludes the larger issues of enquiry into the origins and development of
nations which exercised earlier historical sociologies of nationalism.
I do not wish to be understood as implying that the study of everyday
nationhood has no place among the approaches to our understanding of
nations and nationalism. On the contrary, such studies are vital, but only if
they are part of wider approaches. But, though Jon Fox and Cynthia Miller-
Idriss are critically respectful of previous scholarship, they clearly oppose it
to the study of everyday nationhood. Their assumption is that previous
accounts were more or less exclusively elite-centred (though they cite the
exception of Eric Hobsbawm).
However, such an assumption is in part misleading. Admittedly, someone
such as Elie Kedourie (1971), with his concern for ideas, concentrated on
the intellectuals, the ‘marginal men’. But Karl Deutsch’s analysis of the
growth of nations focused exclusively on mass sociodemographic variables
such as urbanization, literacy, communications and voting. Ernest Gellner’s
first theory of nationalism (1964: Chapter 7) highlighted the role of the
recently urbanized ‘proletariat’ as one of the two prongs of nationalism (the
other being the intelligentsia). Tom Nairn (1977) spoke of ‘mass sentiments’
and of the nationalists ‘inviting the masses into history’ in countering the
depredations of capitalist imperialism in the colonies. In John Breuilly’s
(1993[1982]) historical account, the function of nationalism is to mobilize,
coordinate and legitimate the needs and interests of various groups in
society; while for Walker Connor (1994), the sense of belonging of the mass
of the population is the sole criterion of national existence.
Clearly, there has been no lack of concern for the ideals and sentiments
of non-elites, even if that concern has been less than systematic; and the
same can be said of ethno-symbolist and perennialist scholars such as John
Armstrong, John Hutchinson, Steven Grosby, Adrian Hastings and myself.
But, the central point is that in all these accounts, the emphasis falls not on
the thoughts and actions of the mass of a designated population (the non-
elites), but on the relations and interplay between them and the elites within
a wider national, or international, framework. Unlike the study of everyday
nationhood, this kind of analysis can never be an end in itself, only an essen-
tial part of a wider account of why nations and nationalism emerge and why
they have become such central features of the modern world.
There is a further point. What counts in the study of this relationship are
the links that bind different strata to each other and to their leaders. For
several scholars, these links are to be found in the various symbols,
memories, values, myths and traditions that resonate among different
segments of the designated population. Contrary to Hobsbawm’s argument
that there can be no connection between premodern religious, linguistic and
regional communities and the modern quest for a territorial nation state
(1990: 47), one can demonstrate that some of these communities – along
with their traditions, myths and symbols – formed the bases upon which
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later generations actually sought to create a territorial national state. It is
easy, but quite misleading, to see this relationship simply in terms of elite
appropriation, manipulation and justification. On the contrary: in many
cases, the prior existence of linguistic, ethnic and religious communities
formed the basis of subsequent nationhood, and endowed it with its
‘everyday’ qualities.
For example, the national states of western Europe were formed over the
centuries around ‘ethnic cores’ (the English, northern French, Castilians)
with their particular cultures and symbolisms; without these, it would have
been difficult, if not impossible, for a modern state, however strong and
efficient, to have forged the nation. (We can see the problems of forging
nations and national states in the ethnically deeply divided (ex-colonial)
states of sub Saharan Africa and elsewhere). On the other hand, without
the actions and institutions of the strong, centralized state, we might still
have had only the ‘untutored’ and largely unselfconscious ethnicity of
premodern life (Fishman, 1980). Hence, the importance of the continuing
interplay between the ethnic traditions, myths, symbols and memories of
various strata of the population and the political institutions and
programmes of the elites. Only through analysis of this relationship and of
the ‘resonance’ of these myths, symbols and traditions among non-elites as
well as elites, can we begin to account for the formation of nations and their
subsequent persistence and changes (Marx, 2003).
Now, perhaps the most obvious cultural link in this relationship is the one
that Fox and Miller-Idriss highlight: the importance of mass ritual perform-
ance. In this connection we tend to think of great state occasions – inaugu-
rations, coronations, marriages, jubilees, funerals – for which non-elites
provide audiences and spectators rather than active participants. But there
are also independence holidays that call for solemn rejoicing on the part of
non-elites in processions, parades, flag waving and choral singing. We also
have the mass Remembrance Day ceremonies in memory of those fallen in
two world (and other) wars, in which an official performance by the politi-
cal, military and religious elites is followed by an unofficial and more
informal procession of war veterans, as occurs each November at the
Cenotaph in London’s Whitehall, and across Britain. It is interesting to
recall that both this ceremony and the parallel one in Paris were initiated
by a combination of elite and non-elite action. The original ceremony after
the First World War was extempore and meant to be solely for a single
occasion. But popular demand, and political fears at the time, quickly
convinced the authorities to turn it into an annual institution and entrust its
organization to the veterans’ association (Mosse, 1990; Winter, 1995:
Chapter 4).
The popular element is even more in evidence in the annual Australian
ANZAC Day ceremony, both at the central Memorial in Canberra and at
local monuments across the country. Here, much of the day, after the more
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formal processions organized by veterans associations are completed, is
given over to drinking and celebration of the comradeship (‘mateship’) of
those who fell at Gallipoli in 1916. We can find an interesting parallel, albeit
with greater formality, in modern Switzerland. A similar combination of
state organization and local popular action was responsible for the 600th
anniversary celebrations in 1891 of the Everlasting Alliance of the Swiss
Confederation and the original Oath of the Rutli of 1291. Here it was a case
of local groups, notably in Berne, initiating the summer festival, but soon
the federal state stepped in to organize it on a grander, nationwide scale
(Kapferer, 1988; Zimmer 2003).
The same interplay between elite ideals and non-elite traditions and
attachments characterizes issues of landscape and homeland. This was, of
course, a key part of the nationalist crusades: human beings were to return
from the city’s corruption to the purity of Nature, and there find their ‘roots’
in the (as yet) unspoilt landscapes and unchanging peasant life. One can see
this in the ways in which North American artists such as Edwin Church and
Albert Bierstadt sought out the vast ‘wilderness’ of the American interior;
even when they admired modern progress and its achievements, they
looked to untamed nature to find spiritual exaltation. A similar search for
roots opened the eyes of Russian artists and composers to their vast steppes
and the life of the peasants, even as modern industry was beginning to erode
it. It was the traditions and attachments of the peasants to their landscapes
that was taken up, albeit selectively, by the nationalist intellectuals as key
elements in their programmes to secure a viable and recognized homeland
and to mobilize the mass of its population to support the movement for
political autonomy and independence. (Ely, 2002; Wilton and Barringer,
2002).
Of course, elite programmes did not always carry the non-elites with
them, as John Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss rightly point out. The number
of Irish who could fathom the complex symbolism of the conjoint martyr-
dom of Christ and Cuchulain, which Patrick Pearse propagated in 1916,
must have been severely limited. On the other hand, the equally distant
symbolism of the Finnish sage Vainamoinen and the hero Lemminkainen,
the protagonists of the Kalevala, which Elias Lonnrot had edited in 1835
out of the Karelian ballads that he had collected, was widely disseminated
and became increasingly popular in Finland, especially through the post-
independence school system and the music of Sibelius. More generally,
heroes and golden ages fed the pride of downtrodden as well as dominant
ethnic communities, and cults of such figures as St Joan, Arminius or King
Arthur could touch the lives of millions through public enactments and
schooling. This too became part of everyday nationhood, even if such cults
tended to originate with sub-elites. Moreover, where the cult could be
assimilated to pre-existing religious traditions, as with St Joan to Roman
Catholicism, or the martyr Hussein to Shi’ite Islam, the line between elite
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and non-elite nationhood became well nigh invisible. Both have become
assimilated into an ‘historic nationhood’, the sense of national identity
constructed in and through ethno-history (Branch, 1985; Gildea, 1994;
Keddie, 1981; Lyons, 1979).
We can perhaps see the influence of historic on everyday nationhood
most clearly by considering the ideals of mission and ‘chosenness’, which
play so vital a part in various religions, particularly in the monotheistic
tradition. Religious dimensions hardly figure in Fox and Miller-Idriss’s
analysis and research programme, reflecting the wider failure to place
nationalism within the long-term cultural and religious traditions out of
which it emerged. We may never know how widely a sense of ethnic election
was shared by the populace at large in pre-modern times, except in some
well-documented cases such as the Armenians, Greeks, Irish and Jews, as
well as among the Puritan Dutch, Swiss, Scots, American colonists and
Afrikaners. But, given the proximity of the Church in both the eastern and
western traditions to the villagers and peasants, and, for all its universalism,
its strong practical and organizational emphasis on the vernacular and
ethnicity, we should not be surprised if a sense of ethnic election and
mission became widely disseminated among non-elites. A sense of mission
was also an important motive in, and consequence of, state warfare, particu-
larly on the borders of Christendom against the Muslims, as in Catalonia or
Hungary; though how far mobilized peasants came to share the knights’ or
ghazi sense of religious or ethnoreligious mission we may never know.
Certainly, accounts of battles fought and won (or better, lost) became the
staple of later legend and lore, as well as of works of drama and fiction.
Clearly, this is an area that merits further research. (See Akenson, 1992;
Armstrong, 1982: Chapter 3)
From these brief examples, we can begin to sense the need for a larger
framework, one that brings together the concerns of Jon Fox and Cynthia
Miller-Idriss and the scholars on whom they draw, and those of other
scholars for whom ‘historic nationhood’ is a prime construct. While studies
of the everyday national concerns of non-elites are important in indicating
the degree of ‘fit’ between them and elite ideals and programmes, they need
to be situated within a broader and more dynamic enterprise, one that
locates concepts of the nation and nationalism within a longer time-span,
thereby revealing their profound historicity and their capacity for develop-
ment and change. In this context, we need to remember that nationalism,
despite its unifying core doctrine, comes in different forms, and this variety
not only adds to the subject’s complexity, but also makes it necessary to
place the study of the manifestations of everyday nationhood within both
their specific historical and geo-cultural contexts and the broader develop-
ment of an overall sense of nationhood and nationalism in history. How
far such an ambition is likely to be realized, will largely depend on the
willingness of scholars of different theoretical persuasions to pool their
DEBATE
536-576 088925 Debate (HO)  20/10/08  15:19  Page 571
resources and agree on a common strategy for resolving the many problems
of understanding in the field of nations and nationalism.
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The ‘here and now’ of everyday nationhood
JON E. FOX
University of Bristol, UK
CYNTHIA MILLER-IDRISS
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Anthony Smith’s brief but pointed reply to our debate article, ‘Everyday
nationhood’, reminds us of what inspired us in the first place in our own
scholarly pursuit of nationalism. This time, however, we find ourselves in the
crosshairs of Professor Smith’s critical focus. In the limited space provided
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